We derive a necessary and a sufficient condition for Nash implementation with a procedurally fair mechanism. Our result has a nice analogue with the path-braking result of Maskin [Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, Rev. Econ. Stud. 66 (1999) 23-38.], and therefore, it allows us to give a simple characterization of those choice rules that are implementable, but not in a procedurally fair way. This reveals the constraints that insisting on procedural fairness impose on the collective. JEL Classification: C72; D64; D70; D71
Introduction
Implementation theory studies the following question. There is a set of agents, a set of feasible outcomes, and a set of possible states that define preferences over these outcomes. A central agency, or the mechanism designer, wants to make a choice that depends on the state. The only thing that central agency can rely on in creating incentives is that preferences change between states. The issue is then whether a game, or a mechanism, can be designed so that at the equilibrium the wish of the central agency is fulfilled.
Although many theoretical questions have been solved by now, one central dilemma remains: Why are most mechanism in the real world so simple in comparison to the optimal mechanisms found in the theoretical literature. This is unfortunate since the focus of mechanism design has been on practical application from the beginning. The two leading explanations for this apparent simplicity are:
(1) That the mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment among the agents and the central agency.
Therefore, a weakening of these assumption is needed to conduct useful analysis of practical problems. This is known as the Wilson doctrine 1 and its implications are studied in Bergemann and Morris (2007) among others, and (2) that the presence of competing mechanisms does not allow detailed fine tuning. This is well illustrated by the fact that the revelation principle does not necessarily hold when there is competition among mechanism designer (Peters and Epstein, 1999) , but predicted already by the classic result of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , who show that there may not exist any equilibria in insurance markets since, given the insurance portfolio of one company, others can always reshape their own to attract more good customers. 2 1 Originally formulated by Wilson (1987) . 2 One could express this by saying that mechanism design should turn from partial Needless to say, frequently both, and many more for sure, have their own part to play. The goal, however, is to recognize the main driving force of simplicity. We study a third reason, and what kind of properties it implies for the choice rules, suggested by a casual observation:
(3) Often people do not care whether the goal of the central agency is fair or not, rather they simply demand that the decision making procedure must be fair [see Moulin (1997) for a general discussion]. This is most relevant in social choice problems, exemplified by the fact that most voting rules are fully symmetric, but can certainly have effects in other cases too.
There are many papers that investigate what can be implemented using a specific class of mechanism [Tian (1989) , Sjöström (1994) , Dutta, Sen, and Vohra (1995) , Tatamitani (2001) , Chen (2002) , Mathevet (2010) ] 3 , but they do not give a general characterization of the constraints that insisting on procedural fairness impose, and then there are many papers that investigate exactly these constraints [Galbiati (2008) , Rouillon (2013) ], but only in specific settings. Therefore, a general characterization is obviously called for.
As a general rule the literature on fairness can be divided into two parts (Moulin, 1997) : Papers that deal with procedural fairness (Azrieli and Jain, 2015) and papers that deal with end state fairness [Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1997) , Sakai (2007) ]. The difference is that procedural fairness is a property of the mechanism, while end state fairness is a property of the goal that central agency has. As already explained, our focus is on those cases where agents care only about the procedural fairness, and end state fairness plays no part. We strongly believe that this is the binding constraint in real wold applications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the setup. In particular, we define what is meant by a procedurally fair mechanism. In Section 3 we define a property called permutation monotonicity, equilibrium analysis to general equilibrium analysis.
3 For a general discussion see Saijo, Tatamitani, and Yamato (1996) .
which has a nice analogue with standard monotonicity, and show that it is a necessary condition for Nash implementation with a procedurally fair mechanism. Then, in Section 4, we show that permutation monotonicity and no-veto power are together sufficient for Nash implementation with a procedurally fair mechanism. Finally, Section 5 concludes. Here we explain how our characterization, together with that of Maskin (1999) , can be seen as a characterization of the limitations that insisting on procedural fairness impose on the collective.
The Setup
Let I = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents, X a non-empty set of alternatives,
and Θ the set of states. We assume throughout that the set of states is a subset of a product space i.
This represents the goal of a central agency (mechanism designer) and it is interpreted as selecting the optimal, or acceptable, alternatives at each state. However, central agency does not know the true state, only agents do. Therefore, it has to create incentives for the agents to reveal their information, and this can only be done if preferences change between states.
The preference relation of agent i at state θ ∈ Θ is denoted by θ i .
Next we have to define what is the method that central agency can use to elicit the information from the agents. Given n message spaces M 1 , . . . , M n , a mechanism g on X is a mapping
We denote M = M 1 × · · · × M n and write this mechanism as G = (M, g). 4 Once a state θ ∈ Θ is given, and preferences are therefore fixed, mechanism G for all i ∈ I and all m i ∈ M i . 5, 6 The set of all pure strategy Nash equilibrium profiles of Γ(θ) is denoted by N E (G, θ) . For arbitrary games the size of this set can be anything between empty and infinite.
We say that mechanism G Nash implements CR f :
In words, that is, if the outcomes at pure strategy Nash equilibrium profiles coincide exactly with the CR f . A given CR is then called Nash implementable if there exists some mechanism that Nash implements it. The path-braking result of Maskin (1999) says that if a CR is Nash implementable, then it is (Maskin) monotonic, and if it is monotonic and satisfies no-veto power (NVP), then it is Nash implementable. Choice rule f is monotonic, if for all θ, ψ ∈ Θ, and all
for all i ∈ I, then x ∈ f (ψ). 7 It satisfies no-veto power , if for all θ ∈ Θ, and all x ∈ X, if x is the best alternative of at least n − 1 agents at state θ, then
This result assumes, however, that central agency can use any mechanism it wants to. By contrast, we assume that the mechanism has to be procedurally fair. A permutation is a one-to-one function π : I → I and the set of all permutations is denoted by Π . When a permutation π is applied to an n -profile, for example to a state θ, it means a permutation of the components, , θ π(n) . 8 In all our definition, given and forthcoming, we assume that either the set of alternatives X does not depend on the identity of the agents, in which case we denote it by A, or it consists of n -profiles, in which case we denote it by Y . The first case X = A is a standard social choice setting, like a voting situation, and the second case X = Y is a standard economic setting, like a resource allocation problem. We want to handle both cases at once.
Notice that in the first case permutation does not change the alternative,
6 We explain later on why it is legitimate to concentrate on pure strategies only. 7 Monotonicity is called strong positive association by Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) .
that is π(a) = a for all (a, π) ∈ A × Π , and in the second case permutation affects the components of the alternative, that is π(y) = (y π (1) , . . . , y π(n) ) for 
) is procedurally fair if for any permutation π ∈ Π , and any message m ∈ M, such that g(m) = x and
Here X i is the set of alternatives that agent i can get by unilaterally de-
, so the definition simplify considerably. The general con-
, which applies only in the case X = Y , means that agent i is not only looking at the set X π(i) where agent π(i) was able to deviate from m, but rather he is looking it placing himself in the shoes of agent π(i).
Why do we not simply require full symmetry of the mechanism, that is
The reason is that, as a representation of procedural fairness, this is too demanding. For example, suppose that g(m) = x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and m 1 = m 2 = · · · = m n . Then, if we require full symmetry, it must be that
As this holds for any permutation π, we get x 1 = x 2 = · · · = x n . However, there is nothing procedurally unfair in a mechanism where the agents can agree, by sending the same message, that an asymmetric outcome x ∈ X should be selected. This is even more so if it is possible to agree on similar grounds that π(x) should be selected by sending another message. The point is that full geometric symmetry is certainly not the same thing as 9 Preferences can be other regarding since we do not assume that x y iff x i y i . 6 procedural fairness. The weaker assumption which says that if g(m) = x for some m ∈ M, then there must exist another message profile m ′ ∈ M, such that g(m ′ ) = π(x), is part of our definition.
Definition 2. We say that CR f : Θ → X is symmetric Nash implementable if, and only if, there exists a procedurally fair mechanism that Nash implements it.
In the rest of this paper we study what kind of properties procedural fairness, as we have defined it, implies for the choice rule. 10
Permutation Monotonicity
The following property is to symmetric Nash implementation what monotonicity is to Nash implementation.
If X = A, then this property is almost monotonicity, the only difference is that lower contour sets of x at θ can be permuted in any way. That is, the condition on lower contour sets simplify to:
On the other hand, if X = Y , then the condition is much more complicated since the set π L π(i) (x, θ) is usually not the set L π(i) (π(x), θ). This would not necessarily hold even if preferences are such that x i y iff x i i y i .
Choice rule f is called anonymous, if for all θ, ψ ∈ Θ, and all π ∈ Π, if
For an anonymous CR it does not matter who has which preferences. It is obvious that in the standard social choice setting permutation monotonicity implies both monotonicity (select π = id) and anonymity (select π in such way that
10 See Pratt (2007) and Thomson (2011) for more on fairness. 11 See Moulin (1988) .
However, the next example shows that monotonicity and anonymity are not together sufficient to imply permutation monotonicity even in this case. Let the CR f be such that f (θ) = {a} and f (ψ) = {d}. It is monotonic, since
, and anonymous, since preferences at state θ are not a permutation of preferences at state ψ. However, it is not permutation monotonic since
while a f (ψ). ♦ Our first theorem gives a necessary condition for a CR to be symmetric Nash implementable. Theorem 1. If CR f : Θ → A is symmetric Nash implementable, then it is permutation monotonic.
Proof. Suppose that θ, ψ ∈ Θ, x ∈ f (θ), and π ∈ Π , are such that
) be a procedurally fair mechanism that implements f . Since x ∈ f (θ), there must exists m * ∈ N E(G, θ), such that g(m * ) = x, and
Therefore, by assumption, m is a Nash equilibrium of G at ψ. Finally, since G implements f , this implies π(x) ∈ f (ψ) as was to be shown. This theorem make no assumptions about the number of agents. As a 12 The convention here is that an alternative higher in the table is preferred. Suppose that there is a third agent who has the same preference relation a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d at both states θ and ψ. This guarantees that NVP is satisfied, and therefore implementability coincides with monotonicity. Furthermore, to check monotonicity, we do not need to worry about the agent with the same preference relation at both states. The CR f given in this example was monotonic, and hence Nash implementable, but not permutation monotonic, and therefore not by any procedurally fair mechanism. Let the CR h be such that h(θ) = {a} and h(ψ) = {a, d}. It is easy to verify that this CR is permutation monotonic. In the next section we prove that h is symmetric Θ → X by the rule:
Furthermore, he shows that the following mechanism Nash implements it:
For each i ∈ I, let M i = X (the set of alternatives), and then define the outcome function g IR : M → X as: 
Sufficient Conditions
We are now ready to present the main result.
Theorem 2. Let n ≥ 3. If CR f : Θ → X is permutation monotonic and satisfies NVP, then it is symmetric Nash implementable.
Proof. To prove this claim we need a procedurally fair canonical mechanism. First of all, since state space Θ is not necessarily symmetric, we define a virtual state space Θ v by the rule: For any π ∈ Π , and any θ ∈ Θ, let the state θ π be such that the preference of agent i is θ π(i) , and set
Notice that preferences at state θ π and θ π ′ can be the same even if π π ′ . Moreover, central agency knows that all states in Θ v are not logically possible, it just needs to respect procedural fairness. Then, we expand f into this set by defining a virtual choice rule (VCR) f v : Θ v → X by the condition:
This is the only way to expand f in a symmetric way. The message space of (2) If m j = (θ, π, x, n j ) for all j ∈ I \{i}, m i = (θ i , π i , x i , n i ), and x ∈ f v (θ π ),
x, otherwise.
(3) In all other cases, denote k = argmax i∈N n i , and set
REMARK: The fact that this mechanism has no mixed strategy equilibria can be proved exactly the same way as in Maskin (1999) . Therefore, if integer games and infinite message spaces are allowed, then it is legitimate to focus on pure strategies only. ♦
Lemma. This mechanism is procedurally fair.
proof. There are three cases to consider depending under which rule the outcome is calculated:
By Definition 1 we have to find a message profile m ′ , such that g(M i , m
, and moreover
and since
15 All permutations π ∈ Π are invertible and π −1 ∈ Π . 16 ψ • π is clearly a permutation.
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(2) Suppose that m j = (θ, π, x, n j ) for all j ∈ I \ {i}, m i = (θ i , π i , x i , n i ),
By Definition 1 we have to find a message
, n i ) for all ψ(j) i, and choose m ψ −1 (i) in such a way that the outcome is calculated using rule (2). Then, g(M j , m −j ) = X for all ψ(j) i, and since
here we have used all those conditions that were used in the previous case as well with the additional fact that
Let G = (M, g) denote the mechanism defined above. We prove that it implements any CR that is monotonic and satisfies NVP and therefore it is canonical.
Suppose that θ ∈ Θ is the true state, and x ∈ f (θ). Let the message profile m = (m 1 , . . . , m n ) be such that m i = (θ, id, x, 1) for all i ∈ N . If agent i deviates unilaterally to rule (2), he can get any alternative from the set
Therefore, m is a Nash equilibrium of G at θ, and since g(m) = x by definition, we have shown that f (θ) ⊆ N E(G, θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. A bit more work is need to prove the converse.
To begin with, if we have a Nash equilibrium where the outcome is calculated using rule (2) or (3), then, since the outcome must be the best alternative of at least n − 1 agents in both cases, NVP guarantees that the outcome coincides with f . Suppose, therefore, that m ∈ N E(G, θ) and the outcome is calculated using rule (1). That is, for some ψ ∈ Θ and y ∈ f v (ψ π ), the message of agent i ∈ N is m i = (ψ, π, y, n i ). Since ψ π is not necessarily the true state θ, we need to show that y ∈ f (θ).
By the definition of mechanism G, and the fact that m ∈ N E(G, θ), we get
π(π −1 (y)) = y, and π −1 (y) ∈ f (ψ) by definition, permutation monotonicity implies y ∈ f (θ) as was to be shown. This complete the proof.
This theorem has a nice analogue with the corresponding result of Maskin (1999) given in Sect. 2 − it is just that monotonicity is replaced with permutation monotonicity.
Example 4 (No-Envy Correspondence). There is a bundle of goods Ω ∈ R l ++ to be distributed. Let z i ∈ R l + be the bundle that is given to agent
= Ω the set of feasible allocations, and Z 0 = z 0 ∈ R n + | z 0 ≤ Ω the set of possible consumption bundles for any agent. 17
At each state θ ∈ Θ, the preference relation This correspondence satisfies NVP if there are at least three agents since the best allocation is to get the entire endowment Ω and leave everyone else with nothing. Thomson (2005) gives a nice mechanism, that he calls the "divide and permute"' -mechanism, which Nash implements ef . Therefore, by the theorem of Maskin (1999) , it must be monotonic as well. It is not, however, procedurally fair. Nevertheless, from the work of Galbiati (2008) , we known that ef can be Nash implemented with a procedurally fair mechanism. By Theorem 2 this means that ef must be permutation monotonic. We verify this directly.
17 z ∈ R l + means that all components of z are non-negative and z ∈ R ln ++ means that all components of z are positive. Moreover, z 0 ≤ Ω means that z 0 i ≤ Ω i for all i ∈ I . 18 This concept was originally defined in Foley (1967) .
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Suppose that θ, ψ ∈ Θ, x ∈ ef (θ), and
and ef is indeed permutation monotonic.
Just like in the case of weak Pareto correspondence, a sub-correspondence of ef is not necessarily monotonic, and therefore not necessarily permutation monotonic either, so this has to be checked every time.
Concluding Discussion
We have derived a necessary [Theorem 1] and a sufficient [Theorem 2] condition for a CR to be Nash implementable by a procedurally fair mechanism or symmetric Nash implementable. Although our characterization is simple and it has a nice intuitive interpretation, which is a desirable feature for this type of results, the most interesting result comes as a corollary from a comparison to the corresponding result of Maskin (1999) . Recall that no-veto power holds vacuously in any resource allocation problem (see Example 4).
Corollary. Choice rule is Nash implementable in an economic environment, but not by any procedurally fair mechanism if, and only if, it is monotonic, but not permutation monotonic.
We saw in Example 2 that if a CR is efficient in the sense of weak Pareto optimality, which is a minimal desideratum in economic environments, then the constraints imposed by permutation monotonicity are stronger than those imposed by standard monotonicity.
Also another interesting observation emerge from a comparison to existing literature. In a recent paper Azrieli and Jain (2015) study the same problem as we do here, except that they focus on the case of incomplete information, and hence use Bayes-Nash equilibrium as the solution concept. This is not the only difference, however, since they rely on the revelation principle, and therefore study partial implementation rather than full implementation as we do here. Interestingly, although not surprisingly, their result stands in a stark contrast to ours. While our conclusion is that symmetry (procedural fairness) is a strong constraint on implementability, since permutation monotonicity is a lot more demanding than monotonicity, their conclusion is that symmetry is only a weak constraint. 19 There is a simple explanation for this apparent contradiction however. In full implementation symmetry implies that with one equilibrium a symmetric equilibrium is created alongside, while in partial implementation, with focus on the truthful Bayes-Nash equilibrium only, this other equilibrium can be neglected. Azrieli and Jain (2015) explain this by observing that symmetry is not severely binding since the truthful equilibrium can be asymmetric. This is not possible in full implementation since also the symmetric equilibrium has to be accounted for. 19 The contrast is made even deeper by the fact that their concept of symmetry is stronger than ours.
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